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NOTE
Employment in the Federal Civil Service-
Aliens Need Not Apply
Vergara v. Hampton
581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978)
On August 24, 1978, in Vergara v. Hampton,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in holding that an Execu-
tive Order barring lawfully admitted aliens from the competitive serv-
ice did not exceed the President's authority, sustained a broad pro-
hibition against alien employment in the federal government. 2  Under
this Executive Order, the Civil Service Commission was given au-
thority to restrict admission to the competitive service examination or
appointment in the civil service to citizens or nationals of the United
States.3 Only when it was necessary for the efficiency of the Service
1. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1993 (1979). Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of or the decision
on this petition.
2. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1977), which amended Civil Service
Commission Rule VII, 5 C.F.R. § 7.1 et seq., by adding § 7.4, which states in part:
"'No person shall be admitted to competitive examination unless such person is a
citizen or national of the United States."
The term "alien," as defined by the statute, means a person who is not a citizen
or national of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(3) (1976). The broad prohibition
against alien employment applies to all positions filled through civil service competi-
tive examination procedures. Accordingly, admission to the examination is limited to
those persons who are citizens of, or who owe permanent allegiance to the United
States. 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1978). See Comment, Alien's Right to Work: State and Federal
Discrimination, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 835, 855 (1977).
3. Executive Order No. 11,935 delegated power to the Commission to set
standards for admission to the civil service. The Commission decided that one such
standard would be the prohibition of aliens in federal employment. The text of the
President's statement, in full, reads as follows:
(a) No person shall be admitted to competitive examination unless such
person is a citizen or national of the United States.
(b) No person shall be given any appointment in the competitive service
unless such person is a citizen or national of the United States.
(c) The Commission may, as an exception to this rule and to the extent
permitted by law, authorize the appointment of aliens to positions in the
competitive service when necessary to promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice in specific cases or for temporary appointments. 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1978).
The term "national" means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state, or a
citizen of the United States, or those born in a territorial possession of the United
States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a) (21)-(22), 1408 (1976). In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 90, n.2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Mow Sun Wong], Justice Stevens
narrowed the definition to include all Americans and natives of American Samoa.
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could the Commission make an exception to this restriction, and then
only in specific cases and only for temporary appointments. 4 The
order amended a previous Civil Service Regulation which excluded
aliens from government employment. It was neither clear which gov-
ernment entity had actually prescribed the regulation excluding
aliens, nor what government interests it was intended to further.
5
A citizenship requirement for government employment has been
a part of the Commission's policy since its inception, although many
exceptions have been made in its application. 6 The specific regula-
tion involved in the Vergara case and amended by the Executive
Order in question was the result of an order issued by President
Eisenhower in 1954. 7 The language of that order did not demand the
4. As the Supreme Court stated in Mow Sun Wong, the main concern of the
Civil Service Commission is efficiency. Any regulations that the Commission would
promulgate would have to evidence an efficiency concern as its underlying basis. Any
regulation made outside the scope of this concern would need the express approval,
and more likely, the initial promulgation, of that level of government responsible for
its effect. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 88.
5. In 1954, President Eisenhower issued an Executive Order pursuant to a stat-
ute authorizing him to do so. Exec. Order No. 10,577, § 2.1(a), 3 C.F.R. 218, 219
(1954-1958 Comp.). The statute provided, in part, that the President may:
(1) prescribe such regulations for admission of individuals into the civil
service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that
service;
(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health, character, knowl-
edge and ability for the employment sought; and
(3) appoint and prescribe the duties of individuals to make inquiries for
the purpose of this section. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
The Executive Order issued by the President read, in part, as follows:
The Civil Service Commission is authorized to establish standards
with respect to citizenship, age, education, training and experience, suit-
ability, and physical and mental fitness, and for residence or other re-
quirements which applicants must meet to be admitted or rated in exami-
nations.
The Commission, pursuant to this authorization, issued one regulation that pro-
vided in part:
(a) A person may be admitted to competitive examination only if he is a
citizen or owes permanent allegiance to the United States.
(b) A person may be given appointment only if he is a citizen of or owes
permanent allegiance to the United States. 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1971).
The primary issue concerning the above regulation was whether it exceeded the
authority of the Commission, as stated in President Eisenhower's order of 1954. The
decision reached in Mow Sun Wong was that the regulation was not made by a level
of government with the proper authority and was invalid.
6. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 104-11. The Court traced a brief history of the
Civil Service Commission as well as the various exceptions made in the citizenship
requirements.
7. See note 5, supra.
NOTE
complete denial of employment to aliens, nor did it specify any par-
ticular interests attributable to the federal government that would ra-
tionally be served if such a denial were adopted by the Commission
in the form of a regulation. 8 Nevertheless, such a regulation was
promulgated by the Commission.
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that a regulation barring aliens
from employment in the federal civil service was invalid as a denial of
due process. 9 The Court found that exclusion from federal employ-
ment amounted to deprivation of a "liberty interest" 10 under the
Constitution, and that due process required that a regulation legiti-
mately serve the interests that were intended to support its adoption,
which the regulation at issue did not.'1 Shortly after this decision
was handed down by the Court, the Executive Order in the instant
case was published. 1 2  In reviewing the relief requested by the
8. The language used in the Executive Order issued by President Eisenhower does
not expressly prohibit aliens from federal employment. The order merely grants
the Commission power to establish certain standards with respect to citizenship, as
well as ascertaining the applicant's fitness. It includes nothing pertaining to the ex-
clusion to employment to certain persons. Conversely, the order issued by President
Ford in 1976 specifically excludes aliens from the competitive examination process or
appointment in the Civil Service. Neither order specifies any governmental interests
or policies which would be furthered by it, or by such a regulation. However, Presi-
dent Ford's order was accompanied by identical letters addressed to the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate, articulating the national interests fur-
thered by his order. Pres. Ford, Letter of Sept. 2, 1976, Citizenship Requirements
for Federal Employment, 41 Fed- Reg. 37303 (1976).
9. See Mow Sun Wong, supra note 3.
10. Id. at 102.
11. Interests that could support such a broad prohibition of employment are na-
tional security, preservation of the long-standing policy of prohibiting aliens from
employment in the Civil Service, foreign affairs and policy formulation, the quality of
the service, and maintenance of the status quo to avoid inefficiency.
In his letter, addressed to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House, President Ford stated:
[ilt is in the national interest to preserve the long-standing policy of gen-
erally prohibiting the employment of aliens from positions in the competi-
tive service, except where the efficiency of the service or the national
interest dictate otherwise in specific cases or circumstances. It is also my
judgment that it would be detrimental to the efficiency of the civil service,
as well as contrary to the national interest, precipitously to employ aliens
in the competitive service without an appropriate determination that it is
in the national interest to do so. Therefore, I am issuing an Executive
Order which generally prohibits the employment of aliens in the competi-
tive service. Letter of Sept. 2, 1976, supra note 8, at 37303.
12. See note 3, supra. The order was made in direct response to the invalidation
of the Commission's regulation in the Mow Sun Wong decision.
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appellants,' 3 which was denied by the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the circuit court
held, affirmed and modified: The Executive Order was within the
President's authority, it did not violate due process, those aliens to
whom it applied did not fall within the protection of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, and appellants were entitled to class status. 14
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION SIGNIFICANT TO THE DECISION
The decision of the district court to dismiss the original action
was issued in a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the plain-
tiff's motions: (1) to be certified as a class action; and (2) for summary
judgment. 15 In the same order, the court granted the appellants'
motion for summary judgment on the remaining issues.' 6 The circuit
court in the Vergara case treated the district court's denial of class
representation summarily. The circuit court determined that
threshold requirements of numerosity, need, and common question
were all satisfactorily met, and thus established the predicate neces-
sary to bring a class action. 17
The circuit court then turned to the remaining substantive is-
sues, which were found to be inextricably related to the Supreme
Court decision of Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong. 18 In Mow Sun
13. The appellants ... "[sought] to enjoin the [Civil Service Commissioner] from
continued enforcement of the Executive Order and from refusing to examine, appoint
and certify them for employment in the United States Civil Service." See Appellants'
Opening Brief at 2.
14. The district court's holding as to the issues of the Presidential authority, due
process, and equal protection was affirmed. The decision was modified as to the
issue of class status, which status the appellants were granted. Vergara v. Hampton,
581 F.2d 1281 (1978) (hereinafter Vergara).
15. The district court found that class status under Federal Rule 23 could not be
sustained because the class would be too broad, the plaintiff's claims too divergent,
and the plaintiffs, therefore, would not be representative of persons within the rep-
resented class. Vergara v. Hampton (No. 73 C 25.37, N.D. 111. July 21, 1977) (unre-
ported memorandum decision).
16. The district court determined that the interests of the government justified its
action, noting that courts have historically deferred to the federal government in
matters regarding immigration and naturalization. Id.
17. The Supreme Court invalidated a civil service regulation promulgated by the
Commission pursuant to what it deemed as proper authority granted in President
Eisenhower's Executive Order. In ruling the regulation invalid, the Court did not
hypothecate whether a similar or identical regulation would be invalid if it were
properly authorized. In direct response to this decision, President Ford issued a new
Executive Order amending the previous civil service rule. Supra note 2.
18. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
NOTE
Wong, the Court held that a Civil Service Commission regulation
barring legally admitted resident aliens from civil service employment
deprived them of due process and was, therefore, unconstitutional.' 9
The Court determined that constitutional safeguards, applied by the
Court to discrimination against aliens by state regulations, could be
overridden by certain "national interests," but only when those in-
terests were asserted by the federal government.2 0 Therefore, the
federal government could bar all aliens from employment if it could
justify blanket discrimination by asserting purely national interests. A
bar of this type would make citizenship a prerequisite to seeking fed-
eral employment. Specifically reserved by the Court was the question
of whether such federal citizenship requirements would be suscepti-
ble to or immune from constitutional challenge. 2 1  In the instant
case, this challenge occurred as a result of President Ford's reaffirma-
tion, in Executive Order No. 11,935, of the government's policy pro-
hibiting alien employment in the civil service.
Although the Vergara court reached a conclusion with respect
to the Executive Order only, it seems appropriate to review the
19. For a detailed discussion of due process and its related considerations, not
within the scope of this note, see generally Comment, Procedural Due Process and
the Exercise of Delegated Power: The Federal Civil Service Employment Restriction
on Aliens, 66 GEO. L.J. 83 (1977); Rosberg, Aliens and the National Government,
1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275 (hereinafter cited as Rosberg); Note, Wandering Between
Two Worlds: Employment Discrimination Against Aliens, 16 VA. J. LN47'L L. 355, 367
(1976).
20. The Supreme Court has implied in a line of cases that although the constitu-
tional requirements of due process and equal protection are applicable to both the
states and the federal government, they may be overridden by national interests
peculiar only to the federal government. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson", 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (aliens are a suspect classification, war-
ranting strict judicial scrutiny of any infringement of their constitutional rights);
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See generally Miller, Inmigra-
tion and Nationality Law, 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF NATIONALITY LAw 205; Das,
Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens-The Impact of the Constitution and
Federal Civil Rights Laws, 38 U. PiTT. L. REV. 499 (1974).
21. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 116. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr.
Justice Marshall joins, concurring, stated:
I join the Court's opinion with the understanding that there are reserved
the equal protection questions that would be raised by congressional or
Presidential enactment of a bar on employment of aliens by the federal
government. 426 U.S. at 117.
For an interesting discussion of this action by the Court, see generally Rosberg,
supra note 19.
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Supreme Court's decision in Mow Sun Wong, focusing on the regulation
found to be invalid there and the subsequent order which gave that
regulation new vitality. In Mow Sun Wong, one of the Court's basic
objections to the regulation promulgated by the Commission was the
lack of any express requirement, either by Congress or by the
President, that the Commission adopt such a regulation. 22  Such an
objection is justified when a regulation is so expansive as to deprive
an entire group of people the right to employment by the very
government that initially welcomed them as inhabitants.
2 3
The Court stated that "if the [regulation was] expressly man-
dated by the Congress or the President we [the Court] might presume
that any interest which might rationally be served by the [regulation]
did in fact give rise to its adoption." 24 However, the Executive
Order giving rise to the adoption of the regulation only authorized
the Commission "to establish standards with respect to citizen-
ship ...... 25 It was not a command by the President to require
citizenship as a "general condition" of employment by the Commis-
sion, but was more reasonably interpreted as a command to "classify"
positions for which citizenship would be a prerequisite. 26
It is apparent that aliens are protected by the Constitution and
may exercise many of the rights and privileges granted to citizens.
27
22. This objection was the cornerstone of the Court's decision to invalidate the
regulation. The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate immigration and
naturalization. Congress delegated that power to the President in the area of alien
employment in the civil service. President Eisenhower's Executive Order merely
authorized the Commission to set standards for admission to the service; it did not
"'require" it to exclude aliens. A decision to exclude aliens, the Court found, could
not be made by the Commission on its own initiative since such a decision would not
further the efficiency of that agency. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 116.
23. The United States welcomes hundreds of thousands of immigrant aliens each
year to reside within its borders. See Rosberg, supra note 19, at 277.
24. 426 U.S. at 103. Although Justice Stevens states that: "It follows that some
judicial scrutiny is mandated by the Constitution," the Court would, if the regulation
were promulgated by the President or by the Congress and supported by any reason-
able national interest, lower even this scrutiny standard to one of mere rationality.
25. See note"5, supra.
26. 426 U.S. at 112. The Court uses this distinction as a basis for its decision in
Mow Sun Wong, enabling it to avoid other constitutional questions, which it specifi-
cally reserves for the future. Id. at 103.
27. Constitutional protections accorded aliens lie within the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Both amendments specify a "person" as the entity accorded these rights
and do not specify "citizen." U.S. CONST. amends. 5 and 6. See generally 3 EMPL.
REL. L.J. 23 (1977).
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The Court in Mow Sun Wong found that, in addition to those disad-
vantages imposed by the regulation, aliens are subject to disadvan-
tages not shared by the rest of the nation 28 The Court thus held
that ineligibility for employment in a large sector of the economy
"was of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of
an interest in liberty." 29 However, as the Court found, this type of
deprivation, brought to bear by the federal government, could be jus-
tified by national interests furthered by it.
After a brief historical analysis explaining how the present situa-
tion arose, the Supreme Court concluded that those "interests" that
could adequately support an unequivocal determination, by either
Congress or the President, to bar all aliens from employment in the
federal civil service were not interests that could legitimately justify a
like determination by the Commission. 30  According to the Court,
the basic concern of the Commission was providing for its own effi-
ciency, a concern to which it should confine itself.3 1 Since resident
alien status is only granted pursuant to decisions made by Congress
through the exercise of its constitutional power over immigration and
naturalization, or by the President, through the exercise of his dele-
gated power:
[D]ue process requires that the decision to impose that deprivation
of an important liberty be made either at a comparable level of
government or, if it is to be permitted to be made by the Civil
Service Commission, that it be justified by reasons which are
properly the concern of that agency. 32
28. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 102.
29. Id. and accompaying note. See 25 U. OF KAN. L. REv. 593 (1977).
30. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 116.
31. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 114. The Court determined that this concern
for efficiency was confined to very specific areas:
It is the business of the Civil Service Commission to adopt and enforce
regulations which will best promote the efficiency of the federal civil serv-
ice. That agency has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negoti-
ations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions for entry, or for
naturalization policies. Indeed, it is not even within the responsibility of
the Commission to be concerned with the economic consequences of per-
mitting or prohibiting the participation by aliens in employment oppor-
tunities in different parts of the national market. On the contrary, the
Commission performs a limited and specific function. 426 U.S. at 114.
32. 426 U.S. at 116.
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The decision to exclude aliens from federal employment was
made by the Civil Service Commission, a level of government not
comparable to the Congress or the President. 33 The regulation held
invalid in Mow Sun Wong was not justified by considerations or in-
terests properly within the Commission's scope-that scope necessar-
ily encompasses only efficiency concerns. 34 The Supreme Court,
therefore, declared the regulation invalid.
The Vergara court faced the question of whether the President's
Executive Order, reaffirming this invalid regulation and justif ,ing it
with proper national interests, was constitutional. 3 5 The decision
reached in Mow Sun Wong gave the circuit court some guidance. The
circuit court addressed the issues raised by the appellants in light of
the Supreme Court's decision.
II. THE VERCARA OPINION
The three major issues presented to the court in the instant case
were as follows: (1) whether the President's order exceeded his con-
stitutional and statutory authority; (2) whether the order violated the
civil rights provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as it applies to aliens; and
(3) whether the order violated the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 3 6 An affirmative finding on any one of the issues would
render the order invalid, while there had to be a negative determina-
tion on all three issues if the order was to be upheld.
The circuit court stated that the main issue before the Supreme
Court in Mow Sun Wong was whether the interests of the federal
government were identical to the interests which the Civil Service
Commission could rely upon as a justification for adopting a regula-
tion whose sole purpose was to exclude aliens from employment. The
Supreme Court found these interests to be quite different.3 7 Since
33. See notes 22 and 31, supra.
34. Id.
35. This is the primary question facing the circuit court. The Supreme Court
assumed, without deciding, that the President had the power to exclude aliens, as
long as the exercise of that power was buttressed by appropriate national interests.
36. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1281.
37. If the interests of the federal government were coextensive with those of the
agency in relation to the regulation's promulgation, then the agency could use those
interests as a basis for adopting it. The Court, in Mow Sun Wong, determined that
the agency should confine itself to efficiency considerations when adopting regula-
tions. Such considerations would not concern the same policy determinations that
would result if they were subject to forces within the political arena. ld. at 1284;
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103-04, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
NOTE
the interests of the Commission were primarily those of efficiency, it
would be improper, and a violation of due process, for the agency to
promulgate a regulation concerning anything other than those effi-
ciency concerns. 38  In reaching this conclusion, the Court had to first
determine whether Congress authorized the President, who in turn
delegated his authority to the Commission, to initially adopt the regu-
lation. 39 The Supreme Court found that such authorization was
codified in 5 U.S.C. § 3301,40 and that the President had delegated
that authority to the Commission. The Court then had to determine if
the President's delegation of authority was a requirement to exclude,
or merely an authorization to set standards. It found that no such
requirement to exclude existed, and therefore, the regulation was
improperly adopted. 4 1
As the court in the instant case noted, if the Supreme Court in
Mow Sun Wong had believed that the President's statutory authority
was insufficient, it would not have reached the constitutional question
of due process, but would have decided the case squarely on the lack
of statutory authority. 4 2  The Supreme Court did assure that 5
U.S.C. § 3301 gave the Civil Service Commission the power to retain
or modify regulations without further authorization from Congress or
the President. 43  Nevertheless, that assurance was narrowly confined
to regulations "as would best promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice. '' 4 Matters outside this narrow scope would need the specific
reaffirmation of either Congress or the President.4 5
38. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 112-13. See Comment, Procedural Due Process
and the Exercise of Delegated Power: The Federal Civil Service Employment Restric-
tion on Aliens, 66 GEO. L. REv. 83 (1977), in which the author gives an analysis of
procedural due process and its effect on restrictions on alien employment, with par-
ticular attention given to the Mow Sun Wong decision. See also note 31, supra.
39. This area of delegated authority had, until recently, gone unquestioned be-
cause Congressional power to regulate aliens is firmly established in the Constitution.
"The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization
. throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
41. See note 2, supra.
42. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 112. As Justice Stevens explained:
The President's direction to "establish standards with respect to citizen-
ship" is not necessarily a command to require citizenship as a general con-
dition of eligibility for federal employment. Rather it is equally, if not
more reasonably, susceptible of an interpretation as a command to classify
positions for which citizenship should be required. Id.
43. 5 U.S.C. at § 3301.
44. 426 U.S. at 113.
45. Id. at 116. It can be inferred from the Supreme Court's conclusion that, in
relation to the regulation held invalid, an entity of government, particularly the Congress
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
The circuit court viewed the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in
an historical perspective, noting primarily Congress' lack of considera-
tion that this section was ever applicable to the citizenship qualifica-
tions established by the civil service. 46  Interestingly, this argument
was not presented in Mow Sun Wong or in the two subsequent dis-
trict court cases, 47 and it was deleted from the appellants' case in
their petition for certiorari.4 8
The appellants argued in Vergara that aliens were among those
persons that § 1981 protects from discrimination. According to the
appellants, this protection extends to discrimination in employment
generally and applies to discrimination by the federal government, by
its officers, and by the President in the promulgation of orders and
regulations. 49 The circuit court rejected this argument 5° in favor of
the Supreme Court's conclusion in Mow Sun Wong that 5 U.S.C.
§ 3301 conferred adequate power to the President, 5 1
The Vergara court found it unlikely, from an historical view-
point, that after so many years and after the passage of so much
legislation excluding (for various reasons and in various degrees) aliens
from the federal civil service, Congress would consider this section
applicable to citizenship qualifications. 52  As the Supreme Court in-
dicated in its decision, Congress has acquiesced in citizenship restric-
tions imposed by the Commission for over a century. Although this
should not be interpreted as express legislative approval, it may be an
or the President, would have to reaffirm its original unarticulated interests in the
language of the regulation's amendment in order for it to pass judicial inspection.
46. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1285. Contra 3 EMPL. REL. L.J. 12 (1977).
47. Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Santin
Ramos v. United States Civil Service Comm'n., 430 F. Supp. 422 (D. P.R. 1977).
48. Counsel for appellants stated that this argument was inherently weak and
would not be pursued at the Supreme Court level. It was deleted from the appel-
lants' petition or certiorari.
49. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1285. The pertinent parts of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)
read as follows: "All persons ... shall have the same rights .. . to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens ...." The appellants would have the
court read this section as a protection accorded all persons. The section may be
far-reaching, but neither the court here, nor the appellants in the application for
certiorari, believed that it reached so far as to protect aliens from the plenary"power
of Congress acting within its constitutional powers regarding immigration and
naturalization.
50. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1285.
51. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 113.
52. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1285. The circuit court found that in the past forty years
Congress has adopted legislation excluding aliens from employment in the civil serv-
ice. Id. at 1285 n.7.
NOTE
indication that Congress has never placed emphasis on the contraven-
tion of any federal statute because of the regulation.5 3  Emphasizing
the historical aspect, the circuit court held § 1981 inapplicable, and
then addressed the third issue, due process.
54
In taking up the due process question, the circuit court again
analyzed the Mow Sun Wong decision, wherein the Supreme Court
"assumed" that the President could lawfully exclude aliens, although
it did not actually decide that question. 55 The Vergara court, mean-
while, addressed exactly that question, using the foundation provided
both explicitly and implicitly in Mow Sun Wong. 56
The Supreme Court assumed that if nafional interest considera-
tions could justify such a restriction on alien employment, then those con-
siderations must be expressly stated by the Congress or the President.
What the Court was looking for was proper justification for the re-
striction.5 7  This "national interest" justification could take the form
of an added incentive for aliens to become naturalized or, to a lesser
degree, an expendable token to be used in treaty negotiations.5 8 The
53. Id. at 1285. In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), the Court,
for example, interpreted the phrase "national origin" found in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Court concluded that: "To interpret the term 'national origin'
to embrace citizenship requirements would require us to conclude that Congress
itself has repeatedly flouted its own declaration of policy. The Court cannot lightly
find such a breach of faith." Id. at 90-91. The Court suggested that Congress in-
tended the term to be narrow in scope and did not intend it to embrace non-citizens.
The Vergara court applied this same type of analysis to § 1981.
54. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1285.
55. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 114. See also concurring opinion of Justice
Brennan, supra note 20, at 116.
56. Explicitly, the Court grounded its decision to invalidate the regulation on an
analysis of who is to exercise propcr authority to deprive aliens of a right to federal
employment-an agency or the President. This allowed the Court to skirt the con-
stitutional issues manifested in a delegation of power analysis. Implicitly, the Court's
ultimate decision was dependent on determining the balance between the constitu-
tional rights of a minority group on the one hand, and the constitutional and almost
pleiary power that the government possesses in regard to aliens on the other hand.
Although the Supreme Court avoided the issue of Presideitial power in its Mow Sun
Wong decision, the court in Vergara not only faced it, but had to tailor its decision to
that of the Supreme Court.
57. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 115.
58. Justifications such as the ones listed are those properly within the scope of
interests attributable to the President or to the Congress, but they "'are not matters
which are properly the business of the Commission." Id. at 115. While administrative
convenience could justi, certain regulations, the Court found it unable to sustain the
regulation in this case. See Rosberg, supra note 19, at 314.
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Court said that any rational interest would suffice as long as it had
express authorization from Congress or the President."9
The Supreme Court demanded, as a requisite to compliance with
due process, that a decision of such gravity be made, not by an
agency with general authority over aliens, but by a level of govern-
ment comparable in stature to the Congress 60  Congress is the
branch of government possessing constitutional power over the en-
trance and naturalization of aliens. Congress delegated part of this
power to the President; therefore, only the President would have the
same stature as Congress in this area. The Court would find no prob-
lem with due process if the regulation was originally promulgated at
this higher level. The only alternative, and one not utilized by the
government, would be to allow the Commission to make the decision
to exclude aliens, but require that it justify such a decision by citing
interests that were within the agency's normal range of concern. 6 '
The circuit court opinion concluded by expressing the belief that the
national interests contained in the Executive Order were sufficient for
the Supreme Court to find the order valid. 62 The question of
whether due process imposes other limitations was reserved. 63
The Supreme Court decision was sharply divided, an indication
that the Court could interpret the validity of the Executive Order
quite differently today. 64  The Vergara court reasoned that the four
59. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103. In this case, the Court used "rational' in
describing "interests." This is one indication that the Court will not allow the gov-
ernment to use any interest as a justification. The interest must have a rational rela-
tionship to the deprivation set forth in the rule. The traditional test for rational rela-
tionship was set forth by the Warren Court in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1960), where the Court stated: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if'any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 366 U.S. at 426.
60. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103.
61. Id. at 114. This could prove untenable for the Commission since the normal
scope of concern is an efficient federal service. Efficiency may not require that all
aliens be deprived of a job in the government, but only of those positions which are,
in some way, sensitive.
62. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1287. President Ford stated in letters to the Speaker of
the House and to the President of the Senate that he found such a prohibition to be
in the national interest. Letter of Sept. 2, 1976, supra note 8, at 37303.
63. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1287. Circuit Judge Tone stated:
Because the constitutionality of the citizenship requirement has so recently
received intensive consideration from the Supreme Court, and no doubt,
will soon be before the Court again, a further discussion of that subject in
this opinion would be of little value to the Court or to others. Id. at 1287.
64. Two justices joined in Justice Stevens' opinion, but filed a concurring opin-
ion, and four justices dissented. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the opinion
NOTE
dissenting justices would find the order valid, since thev had previ-
ously found the regulation valid. Considering the tenor of the major-
ity opinion in Mow Sun Wong, it was also very likely that one or
more of these justices would now reach a different conclusion in re-
gard to the validity of the order and would uphold it. 6 5
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT'S DECISION
Three months after the Supreme Court's decision in Mow Sun
Wong, President Ford issued an Executive Order reaffirming the
Commission's ban on alien employment in the federal civil service. 66
Since the promulgation of that order, two United States district
courts have held it to be valid in similar litigation. 6 7 Both decisions,
as well as the decision in the instant case, were predicated upon the
Supreme Court's decision. 68  In Mow Sun Wong, the Court em-
phasized that it would "presume" that any interest espoused by the
President or by the Congress which could rationally be served by the
regulation would be viewed by the Court as a valid reason underlying
its adoption.6
9
In view of the Mow Sun Wong opinion, it is doubtful that the
Vergara court could have reached a contrary conclusion. 70  Clearly,
the Supreme Court believed that the statutory delegation to the President
by Congress was sufficient. Second, as the circuit court cor-
rectly concluded, § 1981 was inapplicable simply from an historical
viewpoint. The court in the instant case found it unlikely that the
Supreme Court would hold § 1981 applicable to other acts of Congress
when Congress most likely did not intend such an application to
be made, and additionally, when Congress has made an historical
habit of ignoring § 1981 when legislating with respect to aliens. 71
with the express understanding that the equal protection question, that would un-
doubtedly be raised by enactment of a bar on alien employment by either Congress
or the President, would be reserved. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 117.
65.'Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1286.
66. Executive Order, supra notes 2 and 3.
67. 42 U.S.C. at § 1981
68. All three cases were decided in light of the Mow Sun Wong decision, incor-
porating the Court's rationale almost verbatim.
69. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103.
70. Since the Court in Mow Sun Wong had assumed that the President had the
power to exclude aliens from the civil service, and reserved any constitutional ques-
tion regarding that power, the circuit court could do little beyond invalidating the
order. See Comment, Aliens' Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45
FORDH L. REv. 835 (1977).
71. Vergara, 581 F.2d at 1285. In essence, the Court would have to anticipate
the intent of Congress with respect to the application of § 1981. Contrary views have
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
Third, the circuit court viewed the clue process question, in relation
to the Executive Order, as firmly grounded in the assumption made
by the majority in Mow Sun Wong, namely, that the President has
the delegated power to impose the citizenship requirement that the
Commission had adopted. 72 The Supreme Court's mandate that any
decision to impose such a requirement be made at "a comparable
level of government" was satisfied by the Executive Order. 73  The
court in the instant case, realizing that the Supreme Court decision
was divided, that the Order would probably be held valid if reviewed
by the Court, and that the question would surely be before the Court
in the near future, did not strike out on its own to render an im-
aginative opinion, but instead strictly followed the rationale of the
Supreme Court 
74
One criticism of the Supreme Court's opinion centers on the
majority's decision to assume that the President was capable of order-
ing the exclusion of aliens, while finding that the Commission was
not. 75 This seems to suggest unlimited Presidential power in au-
thorizing total exclusion of aliens from the civil service. 76 Certainly,
the Court could have based its decision on a more stable foundation
by finding the President's authority limited to the same efficiency
concerns as that of the agency, and then voiding the regulation on the
basis of an improper delegation of authority. 7 7  This theory would
have left no question as to the validity of the Executive Order. 78 The
Court's decision in Mow Sun Wong would indeed be hollow if it were
in fact attempting to open the Commission's door to aliens. The order
found to be valid in the instant case merely reversed the effect of the
regulation's invalidation, while infusing it with new vitality. In view
attempted to demonstrate an intention on the part of Congress to broaden the lan-
guage of the section to include aliens. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 529, 533-36 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (general discussion of § 1981 as applicable to
aliens).
72. This power is codified in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
73. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 116.
74. Supra note 69, at 1287.
75. See The Supreme Court: 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56, 108 (1976).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 109.
78. Although the Court could have chosen to find the President's power limited,
Justice Stevens was not willing to limit this power in the area of international affairs.
One author has noted that this may have been the result of a hesitation to invalidate
a regulation based on a clear and unambiguous delegation of authority. Id. at 109
n.41.
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of the Court's reluctance to take a more positive stand, it seems ap-
parent that the Court will continue to retain an aversion to placing
limits upon the President's power over matters fundamentally inter-
national.
The Court seemed to be less solicitous, however, of the President's
executive authority in a case decided the same day as Mow Sun
Wong. In Mathews v. Diaz,79 the Supreme Court held that Congress
may condition an alien's eligibility for participation in a federal
medical insurance program on continuous residence in the United
States for a five year period and admittance for permanent resi-
dence.8 o In Diaz, the Court "emphatically rebuffed this chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the provision limiting alien participa-
tion in the program."'" Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the
majority and had little trouble in upholding the provision: "[Tihe
Court did not show any eagerness to look behind the asserted interest
in encouraging the naturalization of aliens or enhancing the President's
ability to bargain for treaties." 8 2
In declaring the Executive Order to be valid, the court in the
instant case reflected the Supreme Court's hesitation to limit the
President's power in this area. a With considerations of due process
in decisionmaking, rulemaking accountability, and liberty interests in
employment competing with the broad federal power over aliens, the
paramount federal control over immigration and naturalization, as
well as other overriding national interests, the Supreme Court has
had difficulty in developing a standard of review in this area. 8 4 The
circuit court in the instant case exhibited little originality in deviating
from the Supreme Court's decision, applying those guidelines that
the Supreme Court enunciated in Mow Sun Wong. Unfortunately,
whatever guidelines were set forth by the Court were not articulated
in any meaningful formula which could serve as a guide to future
rulemaking.8 5
79. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
80. Id. at 69.
81. Rosberg, supra note 19, at 283.
82. Id. at 282.
83. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1140-46 (1978). The author dis-
cusses the Mow Sun Wong decision as viewed within a structural model of constitu-
tional analysis, including due process in lawmaking and due process in law-applying.
See also Rosberg, supra note 19, at 338.
84. The Supreme Court: 1975 Term, supra note 75, at 110.
85. Id. at 110-11.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS IMPLICIT
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO EMPLOY ALIENS
It is axiomatic in the realm of international law that a sovereign
nation has absolute control over persons who enter or leave its bound-
aries, as well as over what rights or privileges such persons will be
accorded. This power is plenary."" The Supreme Court has consis-
tently upheld the power of Congress to regulate aliens, and in this
respect, Congress has had nearly limitless power.8 7 Historically, the
Court has been reluctant to scrutinize federal legislation on the prem-
ise that aliens do not have a constitutional right to enter the United
States. 88
In 1976, aliens were given some hope of expanded employment
opportunities as a result of the decision in Mow Sun Wong. That
hope was mitigated by the subsequent decision in that case on re-
mand, as well as by the decision made by the Vergara court, and the
fact that the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Vergara appel-
lants. This denial of certiorari indicates that the Supreme Court will
continue to be hesitant in invalidating rules and regulations in the
area of naturalization and immigration when they are justified by
proper national interests. 89 The formulation of policy in this area
necessarily entails arbitrary and fluctuating formulations as to the
numbers of immigrants entering the country, which classes will have
priority to enter, and the conditions under which they may remain in
the United States. 90 Invalidation of one rule could have a domino
86. Mr. Justice Rehnquist emphasized this in his dissent in Mow Sun Wong:
The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United
States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may
come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard en-
forced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention,
[is] settled by our previous adjudications. [citing Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895).]
See generally Rosberg, supra note 19, at 316; W.M. GIBSON, ALIENS AND THE LAW
119 (1940).
87. Rosberg, supra note 19, at 324-25.
88. Id. at 318.
89. Rules governing immigration are detailed, and in many cases, confused. A
country cannot allow all who apply for permission to enter its borders to have free
access. It must discriminate between competing interests. These interests necessarily
include the benefit derived from the applicant by the country, what the applicant can
contribute economically and socially, and whether the applicant has relatives residing
in the country. Once in the country, an alien must periodically register as an alien
and be subject to other restrictions. See note 87, supra.
90. See Rosberg, supra note 19, at 328.
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effect throughout the entire system. 9' Traditionally, these decisions
are politically motivated, and, although the Supreme Court possesses
a legitimate interest in this area, it has not shown a strong desire to
shape that interest into judicial limitations on the exercise of Execu-
tive or Congressional control over aliens.
92
Furthermore, governments must be aware of the diplomatic con-
siderations in formulating immigration policy and rules governing
aliens. 93 The world community is especially sensitive to American
policy in this area. This community necessarily consists of many
highly trained and very skilled persons who could be a valuable re-
source to the United States government. 94 Continued exclusion of
aliens from government employment for a minimum of five years,
therefore, acts to deter the immigration of these persons to the
United States. 95
Additionally, it can be argued that the United States, noted for
its "open" democratic society, should not steadfastly refuse to allow
freely-admitted aliens to be employed by the nation's largest
employer. 96 These persons pay taxes, serve in the armed forces, and
bear all of the burdens of citizenship; yet, in many ways, they are
treated as a second class-bearing the burdens, but not sharing the
rewards. 9 7
However, it is equally important to allow the federal government
to protect the security of the nation in the most efficient way it sees
fit, and in this instance, it has chosen to exclude aliens from the civil
service. 98 In time, the barriers to such employment may be re-
moved as increased global pluralism and altered domestic attitudes
change the perceptions of the government. Until that time, or until
the judiciary feels itself competent to meaningfully question govern-
ment policy in this area, aliens will find the door at the Civil Service
Commission not just closed, but bolted.
91. Id. at 325.
92. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 101 n.21; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81;
Rosberg, supra note 19, at 323.
93. Rosberg, supra note 19, at 325.
94. Id.
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1) (1978).
96. U.S. Civil Service Commission, Federal Civilian Manpower Statistics,
Monthly Release No. SM-13-7812 (Dec. 1978). As of September, 1978, there were
2,872,851 government jobs available.
97. Rosberg, supra note 19, at 328.
98. Executive Order, supra note 3.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari is one indication
that the Court, given its analysis in Mow Sun Wong, is seeking to
hold the government accountable for its decisions. 99 It would seem
that with regard to any decision made by the federal government to
exclude aliens from the civil service, the Court is well aware that
political and traditional constitutional prerogatives place it outside of
the permissible range of rigorous judicial review.100 However, when
such decisions by the federal government deprive aliens of certain
fundamental rights, in this case, of a liberty interest in employment,
the Court will not look merely to the rational basis of the decision,
nor will it strictly scrutinize its purpose.101  The Court indicates that
it will analyze how the rule was made, by whom, and to what end, in
order to determine whether the adoption of the rule was truly legiti-
mate, whether it has retained that legitimacy, or whether it has lost
its legitimacy as a result of an improper justification for its promulga-
tion. 102
Considering the mitigation of historical provincialism and the in-
crease in global pluralism, discrimination against lawfully-admitted
resident aliens on the basis of citizenship seems incongruous. The
open door policy of the United States with regard to the admission of
aliens is decisively a closed door policy when such persons seek
employment in the federal civil service. Perhaps, it could be argued,
aliens should confine their employment preferences to the private
sector and not seek to be employed by the federal government. The
fact remains, however, that the federal government is the largest
single employer in the United States. Thus, when it shuts its door to
qualified aliens, it is closing it on a valuable labor resource.
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99. The Supreme Court: 1975 Term, supra note 80, at 114.
100. Executive Order, supra note 3.
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